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THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM: 
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSITIONS 
IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY1 
Marie BOLTON 
Universite Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand 
Nancy C. UNGER 
Santa Clara University, California 
L'efficacite de la democratie directe dans l'histoire de la Californie reste un sujet de debat 
intense, un phenomene a I' echelle de l'Etat de Califomie mais qui suscite l' attention du 
monde entier. L'article offre une analyse de cette experience depuis ses debuts en 1911 
et apporte un contrepoint a la vague de critiques formulees contre le principe des 
referendums d'initiative populaire. II etudie la protection de l'environnement, un sujet 
qui oppose clairement Les interets de la population et ceux des plus puissantes 
entreprises californiennes. La conclusion est que malgre /es abus, les distorsions et Les 
problemes, la democratie directe, meme imparfaite, reste un outil efficace pour proteger 
I' environnement. Devant l'inertie de I' assemblee legislative et des gouverneurs succes-
sifs, et face aux pressions enormes exercees par Les entreprises pour prevenir toute 
legislation sur la protection de l'environnement, l'exemple de la democratie directe en 
Californie, telle qu'on peut en juger par Les resultats electoraux des referendums de la 
fin du XX' siecle, justifie un optimisme prudent. 
Direct democracy in California represents an im-
perfect addition to a flawed political process ... [and] 
should be regarded more as a warning than an 
exampie.2 
[C]itizens... often stand to benefit from the laws 
created through the initiative and referendum.3 
l. The authors would like to thank Santa Clara University for its generous sup-
port, and students Blair Thedinger and Patty Adams for their research assistance. 
2. Wyn Grant, "Direct Democracy in California: Example or Warning?" Democrati-
zation, 3.1 (1996), pp. 147-148. 
3. Richard Braunstein, "Practicing Democracy: Initiative and Referendum Voting 
at the End of the 20th Century," Ph.D. diss. (University of Colorado, 1999), p. 201. 
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Environmentalists clearly have won-it's an effective 
tool for them. 4 
[V]oting on the propositions is a strikingly idiosyn-
cratic process. s 
Establishing California's "Fourth Branch" 
of Government 
The efficacy of direct democracy throughout California's history 
continues to be a subject of intense debate, a state-wide phenomenon 
with an international audience. California boasts the world's fifth largest 
economy, and plays a leadership role in national, and sometimes even 
international, politics. British scholar Wyn Grant, studying the politics of 
air quality management in California, succinctly sums up the burning 
issue for environmentalists worldwide who are striving to understand 
the efficacy of California's activists' efforts: in "Direct Democracy in 
California: Example or Warning?" Grant concludes that although direct 
democracy has its merits, its history in California ultimately provides 
more of a cautionary tale than a model to be emulated. Other scholars, 
examining the same phenomenon, disagree, but for a variety of contra-
dictory reasons.6 
Previously we examined how other democratic traditions and 
practices, in particular community activism within California, have been 
utilized to promote environmental justice. This study weighs in on the 
debate over the efficacy of direct democracy to bring about environ-
4. Patrick McGuigan quoted in Thomas Cronin, Direct Democraci1: The Politics of Ini-
tiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 200. 
5. John Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends 
of California," American Political Science Review, 63.4 (1969), p. 1211. 
6. See Silvano Mockli, "Direckte Demoktratie in Kalifornien," Annuaire Suisse de 
Science Politique, 31 (1991), pp. 27-44, and Larry Berg & C.B. Holman, "The Initiative 
Process and its Declining Agenda-Setting Value," Law and Policy [Britain], 11.4 (1989), 
pp. 451-469. Grant, pp. 133-149. Elisabeth Gerber, for example, argues that features 
of the legislature, especially party organization, lead legislators elected to represent 
their constituents to vote against their district majority preference. Direct legislation, 
therefore, is frequently the truer measure of the will of the people. Elisabeth Gerber, 
"Legislatures, Initiatives, and Representation: The Effects of State Legislative 
Institutions on Policy," Political Research Quarterly, 49.2 (1996), pp. 263-286. Cynthia 
DeChaine, on the other hand, contests the wisdom of following the "will of the 
people." She reveals how NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard) and a number of other 
factors including education and communication, led to the defeat of a 1997 referen-
dum that would have created an environmentally and economically sound landfill 
project. Cynthia DeChaine, "The NIMBYism in Modern Suburbia: The Case of 
Pomona," International Science Review, 73.1-2 (1998), pp. 103-117. 
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mental protection. 01,11' initial assumptions, based on a great deal of sec-
ondary material and much anecdotal evidence, including our own expe-
riences as California voters, led us to our working title, "Using Direct 
Democracy to Thwart the Will of the People: California Envirorunental 
Propositions in the Late Twentieth Century." However, as we more 
closely evaluated the sources, especially the actual campaigns of the late 
twentieth century and their outcomes, we came to a startling conclusion. 
It is not, despite many scholars' assertions to the contrary, a case of 
"simple black or white, but rather a dirty shade of grey." Further 
investigation revealed results in even lighter tones. Despite its many 
abuses, distortions, and problems, direct democracy remains an avenue 
to be utilized, however imperfectly, to protect the environment.7 
Our focus is state, rather than nation-wide, not just because of 
California's political and economic prominence. What makes California 
unique even among the states utilizing direct democracy methods is how 
frequently and consistently it has exercised these mechanisms. Although 
intended by some of its creators to be a lifeboat to be used only in 
extreme circumstances, direct democracy has been termed the "fourth 
branch" of the state's political system. By the late 1970s, California was 
using the initiative more widely than any other democratic society.8 
Any effort to answer Grant's question as to California's appropri-
ateness as role model for direct democracy, especially concerning 
environmental issues, requires an understanding of both the promise 
and the reality of nearly a century of Californians' efforts to control 
their state. Neither the initiative, the referendum, nor the recall, were 
pioneered in California. Switzerland incorporated referendums into its 
1874 constitution, guaranteeing the rights of citizens to approve or 
reject decisions made by the government, as well as the right to initiate 
legislation. Within the United States, South Dakota made the initiative 
and the referendum a part of its state constitution in 1898. Eight other 
7. Marie Bolton & Nancy C. Unger, "Pollution, Refineries, and People: Environ-
mental Justice in Contra Costa County, California, 1980," Le demon moderne: Ia pollu-
tion dans les societes urbaines et industrielles d'Europe/The Modern Demon: Pollution in 
Urban and Industrial Societies (Clermont-Ferrand: Blaise Pascal University Press, 
2002), pp. 425-438. Marie Bolton mariebolton@minitel.net "Re:Taming the Tiger!," 13 
Jan. 2003, personal email. Direct democracy measures do not take place in a vacuum, 
however. California's adoption of term limits, for example, ensures a steady stream 
of inexperienced, short term legislatures. The subject of the impact of term limits on 
California government, including direct democracy measures, is a story that is still 
unfolding and one that warrants careful future study. 
8. Eugene C.' Lee, "The Initiative and Referendum: How California Has Fared," 
National Civic Review, 68.2 (1979), p. 69. 
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western or mid-western states followed suit before Californians voted 
overwhelmingly to join them in 1911.9 
California's passion for direct democracy was born out of Progres-
sivism, an amorphous movement that is maddeningly difficult to define, 
and yet one undeniable in its significance. Although various progres-
sives sought diverse, sometimes mutually exclusive goals, all shared a 
desire to right the wrongs of Gilded Age America. The "gilt" of the 
period of amazing growth at the turn of the twentieth century was glit-
tering indeed, as industrialization and urbanization quickly transformed 
the United States, enhancing its position economically and politically. But 
rising right along with the gross national product were concerns about 
the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth and power. America's 
reputation as a land of glorious opportunity seemed to be realized 
exclusively by major industrialists who pulled the ladder up after them-
selves rather than allow others to ascend. Citizens who sought remedies 
from their political representatives frequently found government at best 
helpless to curb the harmful excesses, or, at worst, a willing collabora-
tor, as the influence of elected officials was purchased covertly or even 
overtly. Specific solutions to redistribute more equitably the nation's 
wealth ranged from natural resource preservation to tax and labor 
legislation, while efforts to redistribute the political power centered on 
election reforms, including the direct election of U.S. Senators (previ-
ously nominated by state legislators), the initiative, the referendum, and 
the recall, all designed to return political power to the people.10 
In Los Angeles, direct democracy was spearheaded by John 
Randolph Haynes, a Fabian and successful physician who facilitated, at 
the city level, the nation's first initiative, referendum, and recall legis-
lation in 1902, leading to the first recall of a public official in 1904. In the 
minds of citizens throughout the state, the biggest corrupter of the 
legislature was the Southern Pacific Railroad, famously depicted in a 
political cartoon as an octopus, with each of its eight legs wound around 
some crucial aspect of California's political and economic system. 
Progressivism, as the potential slayer of this beast, was personified by 
Hiram Johnson, elected to the governor's chair in 1910. The combined 
efforts of Haynes and Johnson soon made California a leader in direct 
democracy. But with what results?11 
9. John M. Allswang, The Initiative and Referendum in California, 1898-1998 (Stan-
ford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 3. 
10. See Nancy C. Unger, Fighting Bob IA Follette: The Righteous Reformer (Chapel 
Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 
11. See Tom Sitton, John Randolph Haynes: California Progressive (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1992). Frank Norris's classic novel The Octopus (1901) 
CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROPOSITIONS IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85 
Critics paint a very dark picture indeed. From the very beginning, 
ballot measures have been fraught with confusion. In 1912, a "yes" vote 
on a referendum meant a vote in favor of the statute as passed by the 
legislature, while a "no" vote meant a vote to revoke that statute, so a 
vote "yes" meant a vote against the aim of the referendum. "It was 
enough," notes scholar John Allswang, "to confuse anybody." As voter 
pamphlets more clearly explained what each vote meant, and the 
number of measures on the ballot escalated, responsible voting required 
increasing amounts of careful study prior to stepping into the voting 
booth. Lengthy newspaper articles provided extensive information on 
all sides of the issues, augmented in more recent years by websites 
produced not only by the official proponents and opponents of various 
measures, but also by concerned citizens. While many celebrate these 
extensive offerings as some of the most valuable fruits of the "Informa-
tion Age," this potential overload has led to what some scholars have 
termed "voter fatigue," which has resulted in complex measures being 
reduced to campaigns of catchy slogans, and, in more recent years, 
radio "sound bites" and fifteen-second television commercials. 12 
The role played by money in direct democracy from its first 
implantation in California caused many to question the ability of the 
measures to truly carry out the will of the people. As early as 1917 
critics noted the enormously expensive campaigns launched by big 
business concerns to counter various proposals and were especially 
vocal in their opposition to the professional signature gatherers neces-
sary to place measures on the ballot. Valid signatures from a number of 
registered voters equal to 8 percent of the vote in the preceding guber-
natorial election were required to put a measure on the ballot, a process 
that critics argued benefited only those campaigns sufficiently well 
funded to hire signature gatherers. The regulations also limited success-
ful signature gathering to urban areas with sufficient populations to 
make signature solicitation profitable. The expense and organization 
involved in putting measures on the ballot, critics claimed, made direct 
democracy a big business in its own right.13 
Although scholars hold a variety of contradictory opinions about 
the role of money in a ballot measure's success, many are based on 
details the death struggle between wheat farmers and a railroad monopoly in 
California's San Joaquin Valley. 
12. Allswang, p. 19. See also Thomas Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Ini-
tiative, Referendum, and Recall (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 74. See 
Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and Trudi Happ, "Ballot Propositions and Informa-
tion Costs: Direct Democracy and the Fatigued Voter," Western Political Quarterly, 
45.2 (1992), pp. 559-568. 
13. Allswang, p. 144. 
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popular perception rather than evidence. In fact, from the very begin-
ning, major funding has never been a guarantee that a proposition would 
succeed, although significantly, "it could almost always guarantee that 
one could be beaten." Moreover, the widespread belief that increased 
spending over the years has increasingly determined election results has 
been disproved by a careful study of sixty years of campaign spending 
and election results showing that spending on direct democracy meas-
ures, adjusted for inflation, has been remarkably consistent. A variety 
of factors, however, do impinge on the ability of direct democracy to 
carry out the will of the people. In an early example, even proponents of 
the process were frustrated by the ability of political conservatives to 
undo some of Hiram Johnson's progressive programs by utilizing the 
very measures of direct democracy they had initially opposed.14 
Direct democracy measures continued to be confusing and related 
expenditures difficult to trace, as the ostensibly altruistic organization 
formally funding one side of a measure frequently turned out to be a 
front for a corporation with great profits at stake. Moreover, voters 
suffered from "ballot fatigue," brought on by the increasing number of 
measures requiring their vote. Frequently, but not always, position on 
the ballot directly affected the number of votes cast, as propositions 
higher on the ballot, regardless of subject matter, received more votes. 
By 1938, the San Francisco Chronicle claimed that initiatives and referen-
dums "have become a means of confusion and tinkering, crackpot schemes 
and frequent frustration of public information." They remained an inte-
gral part of California's political fabric, however, and frequently revealed 
much about the goals and values of the state's residents. In 1964, for 
example, California voters passed a measure to overturn the Fair Housing 
Act passed by the state legislature the preceding year, an outcome that 
seemed more in keeping with the openly racist southern United States 
than "liberal" California. The California Supreme Court ultimately ruled 
unconstitutional this decision by two thirds of the state's voters to deny 
African Americans fair housing, just one example of the fate of a contro-
versial initiative ultimately being decided by the courts.15 
Environmentalists' interest in this system of government was born 
out of California's number of unique features including an enormous 
and ever increasing population (growing in the twenty-first century at a 
rate of around 600,000 people a year), and a shockingly arid climate. For 
example, the San Jose area, by the 1990s a suburban sprawl of lush palm 
trees and green suburb lawns, home to the world-renown Silicon 
14. Allswang, p. 49. John R. Owens & Larry L. Wade, "Campaign Spending on 
California Ballot Propositions, 1924-1984: Trends and Voting Effects," Western Political 
Quarterly, 39.4 (1986), pp. 675-689. 
15. Bowler, Donovan, & Happ. Allswang, pp. 65, 61. 
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Valley, averages 14 inches/35 centimeters of rainfall per year, less than 
Casablanca. The state, whose survival depends on vast, ongoing manipul-
ation of natural resources, including the world's largest and most 
expensive water delivery system, is especially vulnerable to environ-
mental devastation. Environmental problems range from the high levels 
of mercury left over from the 1849 Gold Rush that still contaminate San 
Francisco bay waters and marine life, to the two million tons of hazard-
ous waste Californians currently generate every year. The vast profits 
of California corporations, ranging from agribusiness to high tech 
weapons development, have allowed them to yield enormous economic 
and political power. In the showdowns between profits and clean air or 
water, profits have continually won out. Many in California found their 
elected officials, unable to resist the siren song of large campaign 
contributions, rendered seemingly oblivious to the environmental crises 
ravaging the state. With all hopes dashed that relief would come from 
the legislature, environmental protection advocates repeatedly turned 
to direct, rather than representative democracy as the only means by 
which polluters and exploiters could be controlled.16 
Direct democracy quickly became the new battleground for the 
water wars that so dominate California's environmental history. The 
attempt in 1914 to invalidate the newly created state commission to 
adjudicat~ water rights failed, but only by the narrowest of margins. In 
the 1920s three well funded initiatives proposing a state water and 
power commission that would have the right to issue bonds and to use 
the proceeds to expand public control of water and power all fell victim 
to powerful campaigns funded by business organizations and private 
power companies determined to resist government regulation of these 
vital resources. However, the record of direct democracy in protecting 
the environment was fairly strong throughout the 1930s as many Cali-
fornians understood the reckless avarice of big business to be the root 
cause of the Great Depression. Voters have fairly consistently opposed 
propositions during adverse economic conditions. In 1933, the Central 
Valley Water Project, passed by the state legislature, resisted a repeal 
referendum launched by private power companies. During this period 
voters also rejected four different attempts to allow state-owned beach 
lands to be leased for mineral and oil production.17 
16. Allswang, pp. 64, 136. Paul Rogers, "Green Blitz for State Parks: Environmen-
talists Push Prop. 12," San Jose Mercun; News 2 March 2000: lA, 16A. "Toxic Ques-
tions," Department of Toxic Waste, 2000 <www.dtsc.ca.gov/ToxicQuestions/DTSC_ 
Overview.html> 10 Jan. 2003. 
17. Based on a study of 1974-92. Sean Bowler & Todd Donovan, "Economic Condi-
tions and Voting on Ballot Propositions," American Politics Quarterly, 22.1 (1994), 
pp. 27-40. Allswang, p. 43. 
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In 1956, the year of the Suez crisis, came one in what would become 
a long series of propositions funded by "Big Oil" which, in the name of 
eliminating waste and maximizing production, threatened state-owned 
tidelands and the public interest. Although vastly outspent, the foes of 
the oil forces mounted an effective counter-campaign, demonstrating 
the maxim that money alone cannot guarantee success. Eight environ-
mentally-related measures were introduced between 1970 and 1982, 
illuminating both the frustration of many with the legislature's inability 
to keep up with environmental abuses, and the conflicts between environ-
mental protection and economic development. The record for 1972 
provides a good example of the inconsistent, yet overall protectionist 
results of such measures: Proposition 9, which proposed a wide variety 
of reforms from pesticide restrictions to a five-year ban on the construc-
tion of nuclear powered electric generating plants, went down to 
defeat. Five months later, Proposition 20, a measure to protect coastal 
lands, passed, despite the fact that the plan had originally died in 
committee when presented to the state legislature and despite the 
disproportionate swns spent by Shell Oil and other business and labor 
organizations to ensure its defeat. In 1982, Californians determined to 
protect the environment overturned legislation that would expand the 
Central Valley Water Project and voted to require the governor to peti-
tion the President of the United States to, along with the Soviet Union, 
stop nuclear testing, production, and deployment.18 
In the more recent debates over the effectiveness of direct democ-
racy, several factors are emphasized by those claiming that it is becom-
ing increasingly undemocratic. They point, for example, to the frequent-
ly tiny number (less than 25 percent) of voters who determine a 
measure's success or failure. In addition, as California's population 
grows, so does the number of signatures required to place a measure 
on the ballot, revitalizing charges that money remained the key to all 
forms of California politics. Environmentalists have been outraged by 
the efforts of various polluters to utilize the initiative process to protect 
themselves. In 1994, for example, the Philip Morris Company, a major 
tobacco producer, contributed $13 million to an initiative promoted as 
"anti-smoking," that, if passed, would have reduced rather than intensi-
fied existing regulations concerning smoking in public places.19 
Environmentalists who defend direct democracy note that ballot 
measures can be funded not just by big businesses, but also by popular 
organizations such as labor unions and, frequently, by grass roots 
18. Allswang, p. 140. 
19. David Hadwiger, "Money, Turnout, and Ballot Measure Success in California 
Cities," Western Political Quarterly, 45.2 (1992), pp. 539-547. See Berg & Holman. 
Allswang, p. 199. 
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groups that are environmentally motivated. The often tiny budgets of 
these groups do not guarantee the defeat of the measures they propose 
-in many instances, environmental Davids have slain corporate 
Goliaths. And while direct democracy defenders acknowledge that the 
actual number of votes on any particular measure may be small, they 
claim that because Americans are decreasingly voting a straight party 
ticket and increasingly voting on the merits of the specific individuals 
and/ or issues in involved, the votes that are cast are based on more 
thoughtful and informed decision-making than blind party alliance. 
Direct democracy defenders also note that, despite the system's various 
imperfections, it still is more truly representative of the people than are 
the legislators they elect. Although elected officials may, in recent times, 
be as likely to be influenced by pressures from within their party 
organizations as by the bribes of big business or the influence of profes-
sional lobbyists, the end result remains the same: they vote against the 
majority preference of their districts.20 
Direct democracy has yielded decidedly mixed results from its 
inception in 1911. In Part Two: "Environmental Propositions in Late 
Twentieth Century California," we examine more recent, specific develop-
ments in the history of direct democracy measures, and offer some 
conclusions as to the appropriateness of California's "fourth branch of 
government" as a model for other states and nations seeking to remedy 
environmental wrongs. 
Environmental Propositions 
in Late Twentieth Century California 
The first thing to impress an observer of California initiative campaigns 
in the 1980s and 1990s is the explosion of big money involved. The 
California Commission on Campal.gn Financing reports that from 1976-
1990, spending on initiatives jumped by 1200%, from $8.9 million to over 
$110 million. In 1988 and 1990, for the first time, more money was spent 
on initiative campaigns that on lobbying the state legislature. In 1990, 
67% of all initiative campaign funds were raised in amounts of $100,000 
or more, and over 33% in amounts of over $1 million. Business 
20. Carl Lutrin & Allen K. Settle, "The Public and Ecology: The Role of Initiatives 
in California's Environmental Politics," Western Political Quarterly, 28 (1975), pp. 352-
371. Lee, p. 76. See also Micah L. Sifrey, "Independents' Day," The Nation, 18 June 
2001, pp. 4-5, and Sifrey's Spoiling for a Fight: Third-ParhJ Politics in America, Routledge 
2002. Gerber, pp. 263-286. See also Richard Braunstein, "Practicing Democracy: 
Initiative and Referendum Voting at the End of the 2011' Century," Ph.D. diss. (Uni-
versity of Colorado, 1999). 
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contributed over 66% of initiative campaign funds, individuals 12%, 
politicians 9%, political parties 7%, and labor 1 %. In the 1990s, every 
election was dominated by a major economic battle in which corpora-
tions spent without limit in order to advance their economic interests. 
This increase in spending brought about a professionalization of initia-
tive campaigns and operations which in turn generated more expenses. 
The cost of qualifying an initiative for ballot increased from $45,000 in 
1976 to over $1 million 1990, due in large part to the increasing need for 
paid signature gatherers to keep pace with the rapid growth of the 
population, as pointed out above, a practice long denounced as a major 
problem. In addition, professional political consultants managed every 
part of a initiative campaign, starting with the use of paid signature 
firms which could guarantee almost any client automatic qualification for 
about $1 million.21 
California corporations were investing in initiative campaigns as a 
means of selling to voters their political and economic vision of Cali-
fornia. Many observers, of all political stripes, have decided that this is 
reason enough to consider direct democracy in California a failure. David 
Broder went so far as to title his 2000 book, Democracy Derailed: Initiative 
Campaigns and the Power of Money.22 This article seeks to counter the tide 
of criticism of the initiative process. Rather than addressing all initiatives 
and propositions in the same manner, here we focus solely on environ-
mental politics, issues which we argue most clearly pit popular interests 
against California's largest and most powerful corporations. We argue 
that corporate manipulation and political corruption is so pervasive in 
the California political system that direct democracy, despite clear abuse, 
remains the best chance of voters to counter the power of big business. 
If we indulge in a bit of "if history," as did historian Joseph Zimmerman, 
we agree that the progressives who put into place direct democracy 
would be disturbed by the large sums spent by corporate interests to 
undermine the initiative process, but "their trust in the common sense of 
the average citizen would be undaunted." To demonstrate our argu-
ment, this portion of our article first outlines the two principle methods 
used to corrupt the California initiative process in the late twentieth 
century: the co-optation of initiatives and the rise of counter-initiatives. 
It then considers the experiences of certain environmental propositions 
in 1988 and 1990, and finally presents our analysis and conclusions.23 
21. California Commission on Campaign Financing; Jim Shultz, The Initiative Cook-
book (San Francisco: The Democracy Center, 1998), p. 81. 
22. David Broder, Democraci; Derailed: Initiative Campaigns and the Power of Monei; 
(New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2000). 
23. Joseph Zimmerman, Participaton; Democraci;: Populism Revived (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1986), pp. 96-97. 
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Starting in the 1970s, state politicians of both parties attached their 
names to initiative campaigns as a way of attracting voters. In his 1974 
gubernatorial prima1y campaign, democrat Jerry Brown joined with 
Common Cause and other reform groups to support a proposition that 
would limit lobbyist spending to "two hamburgers and a Coke." The 
June proposition won by a two to one margin, and Brown rode the reform-
ist wave into the governor's office in November. Similarly, republicans sup-
ported ballot measures that seemed tough on crime. George Deukmejian's 
close association with initiatives to reinstate the death penalty and his 
campaign position in favor of capital punishment helped him win election 
as Attorney General in 1978 and Governor in 1982. As one analyst put 
it, the "adopt an initiative strategy" can result in a "dangerous political 
whirpool in which extreme initiatives get adopted by mainstream leaders 
trying to capitalize on popular emotion. The public votes to send a 
message, but it is the detail of the law that Californians must live with, 
long, long after the politician involved has moved on to other 
ambitions."24 
The co-optation of initiatives continued to increase. Between 1988 
and 1996, candidates for statewide office and other politicians either 
sponsored or affiliated themselves closely with twenty-one ballot initia-
tives. State democrats in the 1980s associated themselves particularly 
with environmentalist initiatives as a way to boost their personal cam-
paigns. Environmental groups, in turn, solicited the support of state 
democrats, eschewing non-partisan politics in exchange for the support 
offered by the democratic political machine. When the Sierra Club asked 
democrat leaders in 1986 for financial support for Proposition 65, the 
"anti-toxics" initiative, Democratic Assemblyman Tom Hayden adopted 
the measure as his central cause, bringing with him popular and lucrative 
Hollywood connections. Democrat candidates for Governor Tom 
Bradley and Senate Alan Cranston also strongly backed Prop 65, 
seeking an issue which would distinguish them from their republican 
counterparts. In part due to this powerful support, Prop 65 passed in 
the November election by a two to one margin. Although Bradley lost 
his race, most analysts credit Cranston's slim re-election to his associa-
tion with the initiative. 
In 1990, environmental initiatives became even further entangled 
with state partisan politics. Environmental groups were preparing to 
launch a variety of separate measures to control pesticide use, and to 
protect coasts and forests. Some groups, wary of becoming embroiled in 
partisan issues, planned to draft measures sufficiently bipartisan to win 
support from both democrat and republican candidates. At the same 
24. Shultz, pp. 86, 88. 
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time, Tom Hayden and democrat gubernatorial candidate John Van de 
Kamp proposed to combine all the initiatives into one single proposition 
and make it radical enough so that republican candidate for governor 
Pete Wilson would be forced to campaign against it. Although many 
environmentalists opposed this strategy, Hayden and Van de Kamp 
were able to win enough support to place Proposition 128, "Big Green," 
on the November ballot. The measure was drafted by Van de Kamp, 
along with Hayden, the Sierra Club, the California League of 
Conservation Voters, and the National Resources Defense Council. Van 
de Kamp also supported two other non-environmental initiatives, 
certain that his sponsorship would strengthen his own campaign posi-
tion with voters. When he lost the June primary to Dianne Feinstein, all 
these initiatives were left half-orphaned, losing Van de Kamp's political 
and financial support as well as the services of his professional campaign 
staff. Although Prop 128 was hopelessly entangled in the gubernatorial 
campaign, both Dianne Feinstein and her republican opponent Pete 
Wilson kept their distance from it, with Feinstein embracing it gingerly 
and Wilson opposing it gingerly. Prop 128 lost in the November election, 
victim to political manipulation, its own complexity, a crowded ballot, 
attacks on Hayden, and as we shall see, a blizzard of corporate counter-
initiatives. Its loss is generally seen as a major reverse of Prop 65's 
victory four years earlier.25 
The loss of this strongly partisan and politically oriented environ-
mental proposition can also be understood as a sign of voters' ability to 
distinguish between citizen group initiatives and political machine 
initiatives. Direct democracy was developed to help voters counter the 
ability of powerful corporations to corrupt political parties, individual 
office holders, and the state political system. The initiative was viewed 
as a way to help voters force reform on specific issues and was pur-
posefully created to bypass the political negotiations in the legislature 
which often bogged down progress. In the late 20th century, most success-
ful environmental propositions were written by environmental citizen 
reformers, targeted specific issues, were short, and avoided bureaucratic 
detail and political issues. In contrast, Prop 128 was the creation of 
political maneuvering, was particularly long (16,000 words in contrast to 
most initiatives which averaged around 5,000), and in one of its most 
controversial sections, created a new state agency. The Office of Envi-
ronmental Advocate would have been a statewide elected position with 
a four-year term and broad powers to use the courts to enforce all laws 
"enacted to protect the environment and public health."26 Opponents 
25. Ibid., 86-7; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990. 
26. The full texts of ballot proposals are available at <http:/ / holmes.uchastings. 
edu>; Los Angeles Daily Journal, 1 November 1990. 
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very quickly labeled this position the "envirorunental czar" or "environ-
mental cop," and warned voters against the potential for a new layer of 
bureaucracy in the state government created to undertake investiga-
tions, studies, and analyses, and to bring lawsuits "to ensure compliance 
with state laws." Voters responded to this argument and were sensitive 
to the proposition's political entanglements. The dissonance was too 
strong between the limited thrust of direct democracy initiatives and the 
octopus-like form of Prop 128. 
Prop 128 shared the 1990 ballot with a wave of counter-initiatives. 
When in 1986, Prop 65, the anti-toxics initiative, passed in spite of an 
extensive and expensive "no" campaign waged by oil companies and manu-
facturers, industry understood that with issues which aroused public 
emotion, a simple call to vote "no" was not enough. In 1988, insurance 
companies began a trend to place counter-initiatives on the ballot, result-
ing in a ballot on which five separate initiatives dealing with automobile 
insurance and tort reform appeared. The 1990 ballot featured a blizzard 
of health and environment initiatives and counter-initiatives. Each 
counter-measure was designed to nullify its progressive counterpart. 
Rather than presenting genuine alternatives, they aimed at confusing 
voters and dragging down all competing initiatives to maintain the 
status quo, itself imposed in part by industry's traditional political 
lobbying tactics. Industry created front organizations with citizen-
friendly names to author ballot initiatives, further confusing voters. 
These strategies were to some degree successful. In what was called 
"the Big NO," voters in 1990 rejected all competing measures, including 
those with strong polling leads shortly before the election. Out of the 
total twenty-seven sometimes complicated initiatives on the ballot, 
voters only passed twenty-three.27 Most analyses of this election focus 
on four competing envirorunental initiatives, as well as two competing 
health/alcohol tax initiatives, to demonstrate the success of corporate 
tactics, but as we shall see the situation was far more complex. 
We have already illustrated the political manipulation of the 
initiative process with the example of Prop 128 on the 1990 ballot. Prop 
128, which would have required significant environmental reform, is 
also a good example of the counter-initiative process. Prop 128, pre-
sented by its supporters as "Big Green," would have imposed a five-
year phase-out of many pesticides, banned the sale within the state of 
any food containing residues of proven cancer-causing pesticides, 
curbed off-shore drilling in state waters, established a $500 million oil-
spill clean-up fund, required upgraded sewage-treatment plants, 
required a 40% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2010, and 
27. See Los Angeles Daily Journal, 7 November 1990. 
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spent $300 million to protect ancient redwood stands and plant new 
trees.28 California's most powerful corporations, those dominating its 
extensive petro-chemical industry, poured millions of dollars into the 
effort to defeat Prop 128, both directly and through the sponsorship of 
their own initiative, Prop 135. 
The petro-chemical industry was especially alarmed about Prop 
128's requirements for emission reductions and its limits on pesticide 
use. Their failure in 1986 to stave off approval of Prop 65, the anti-toxics 
initiative, with dire economic projections designed to convince voters to 
vote "no," prompted them early on to consider multiple strategies to 
defeat Prop 128. A year before the June 1990 election, the Western Agri-
cultural Chemical Association was pressing its members for money and 
organizing its own anti-initiative group, Californians for Food Safety. It 
hired Woodward and McDowell, a campaign-management firm long 
active in California initiative battles, who began a series of radio adver-
tisements against the initiative. In August 1989, Woodward and 
McDowell were forced to recall their ads until they added a required 
disclaimer that chemical company money had heavily financed them. To 
ensure defeat of Prop 128, the industry also launched its own initiative, 
Prop 135, quickly dubbed "Big Brown" by opponents. Prop 135 pro-
posed to voters far less stringent regulations than Prop 128 and specifi-
cally nullified its pesticide portions. In the case of passage of two or 
more competing initiatives, the one with the most votes is dominant. At the 
least, Prop 135 could be counted on to confuse voters, and if Prop 128 
were to succeed, industry could gamble that Prop 135 would as well, 
and perhaps override it with its own, industry-friendly measures.29 
With such high stakes and with such powerful players, the amount 
of money spent on the 1990 initiative campaigns was astronomical. Out 
of the $6.5 million raised to defeat Prop 128, over $5 million came from 
oil and chemical companies.30 
As Carl Pope, national conservation director for the Sierra Club 
explained, "What is driving this is pesticides, pesticides, pesticides." 
California had long been the nation's largest agricultural producer and 
consumer of pesticides. In 1987 alone, 600 million pounds of pesticides 
were sold in California. Campaign-finance statements show that chemical 
companies with extensive pesticide divisions donated over $3.2 million to 
the campaign to defeat Prop 128 and oil companies added almost $1.8 
million. According to Rick Rountree, spokesman for Rhone-Poulenc 
Agriculture Company, "While it's a lot of money, it is not large in terms 
28. See <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu> 
29. Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990; Shultz, p. 89; <http:/ /holmes.uchastings. 
edu>. 
30. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990. 
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of the amount of business we do in California because of the size and 
importance of agriculture in the state." Skip Ragland, spokesman for 
Ciba-Geigy, said the company could lose 30% of its California business if 
Prop 128 were approved and that opposition to Prop 128 is "certainly 
worth the amount of money that's been reported from various 
companies." Prop 128 would have made it illegal to sell any food grown 
outside the state with a pesticide banned within it. Industry was 
concerned that California would provide an example for other states 
that might adopt similar restrictions, or that growers might reduce or 
eliminate pesticide use outside of the state to make sure they could sell 
crops in the huge California market. Bob Neunreiter, of Monsanto, 
pointed out: "It's not just the alachlor [herbicide] market in California, 
it's our alachlor market in Iowa and Indiana, and the major impact on 
that business if 128 should pass."31 
Largest Contributors to Campaign to Defeat Prop 128, 
Operations Concerned, and 
Pesticides Likely to be Banned by the Measure:32 
Company 
Monsanto 
ARCO 
Chevron 
ICI Americas 
Ciba-Geigy 
DuPont 
DowElanco 
Rhone-Poulenc 
Contribution 
405,000 
397,000 
395,000 
379,500 
375,500 
365,000 
359,000 
249,000 
Operation and Pesticides Concerned 
Pesticides: alachlor 
Oil 
Oil 
Pesticides: captan 
Pesticides: simazine, methidiathon 
Pesticides: mancozeb, benomyl, atrazine, linuron 
Pesticides 
Pesticides: fosetyl al, aidicarb 
Other industry representatives minimized the impact of the measure 
on their businesses and portrayed their opposition as altruistic. George 
Dunn, government affairs manager for ARCO, said that Prop 128 
"doesn't affect us that much economically," but that the company was 
worried that the measure "would have such a drastic effect on the 
economy that people would rebel." The front group created by the 
agrochemical industry, Californians for Food Safety, was joined by the 
petrochemical industry's Californians for Air and Water Quality. When 
polls demonstrated that because of Tom Hayden's radical youth, voters 
were wary of his close association with the initiative, a third front group 
was created, "No on 128, The Hayden Initiative." Voters were then 
misleadingly presented with opposition to Prop 128 under the cover of 
progressive or anti-radical sounding organizations, rather than as a "vote 
31. San Francisco Chronicle, 4 October 1990, 31 October 1990; San Jose Mercury 
News, 11 October 1990. 
32. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990. 
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no" movement coming from industry opponents. In contrast to the vast 
swns spent by California's economic powerhouses to defeat Prop 128, 
supporters of the measure raised only $3 million. They were successful 
in making contribution patterns a major campaign issue, but instead of 
creating support for Prop 128, this only increased cynicism about the 
initiative process and encouraged the "Big NO" vote. Prop 128 failed with 
64% "no" votes cast, and Prop 135 failed with 70% "no" votes cast.33 
Following the election, environmentalists readily admitted their 
errors. Sierra Club conservation director Carl Pope concluded that in the 
future, environmentalists would push for narrow propositions, rather 
than broad ones that were now proven too easy to defeat. Lucy Blake, 
of the California League of Conservation Voters suggested that "Big 
Green was a casualty of a broader political climate that really had nothing 
to do with the environment. You can't pull a Democrat or Republican 
lever on the propositions. But you can pull 'no,' and I think that's what 
people did." Another environmentalist anonymously admitted, "As a 
matter of both tactics and policy, Big Green was a mistake. It tried to make 
too much controversial and complicated law in one ballot measure."34 
Voters were presented with a parallel situation on the same 1990 
ballot with two bond initiatives affecting timber harvesting, Prop 130, 
"Forests Forever," and Prop 138, "Big Stump." Wealthy California conser-
vationist Hal Arbit spent $5 million to sponsor Prop 130, which author-
ized a $742 million bond issue to acquire ancient forests and preserve 
wildlife habitat, retrain loggers, ban clearcutting, and mandate sustained 
yield standards. The timber industry countered with an ad campaign 
portraying Prop 130 as an extremist measure supported by fringe envi-
ronmental activists such as Earth First! It also wrote its own measure, 
Prop 138, which would authorize a $300 million bond issue to finance 
private reforestation projects and urban and rural tree planting pro-
grams, negotiate timber management plans, and prohibit the state from 
acquiring timberland without the agreement of the owner. Prop 138 was 
designed to allow timber corporations to continue to maximize their 
operations with a minimum of state interference. Both of these initiatives 
failed to pass, Prop 130 with 52% "no" votes cast, and Prop 138 with 
71 % "no" votes cast.35 
Many observers conclude from the 1990 ballot that there existed a 
crisis in the democratic process due to abuses of direct democracy. As 
pollster Mervin Field suggests, "More times than not, when the 'No' 
side really takes aim, has the money and can find real or alleged flaws, it 
33. Shultz, 83; San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; <http:/ /holmes. 
uchastings.edu>. 
34. San Jose Mercun; News, 11 October 1990; Wall Street Journal, 22 October 1990. 
35. <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu>. 
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can completely turn public opinion around."36 Yet, while still affirming 
the tremendous power that corporations have in influencing politicians 
and the public and even in writing law, we maintain our faith in voters' 
instincts. Prop 128, a sprawling approach to law-writing and an example 
of the political misuse of the initiative process, failed with 64% "no" 
votes. Props 135 and 138, both examples of corporate-sponsored and 
deliberately misleading counter-initiatives, failed with a strong 70% and 
71 % "no" votes cast. Prop 130, a narrowly defined initiative such as 
voters often approve, yet put on the ballot by a wealthy individual who 
himself had disturbingly close ties to the timber industry lost, although 
only by a slim margin of 52% "no" votes cast. In all these cases, the 
voters seem to display a healthy dose of common sense. 
To extend our argument, Props 128, 135, 130, and 138, as well as 
the rest of the 1990 ballot need to be examined in a larger context. The 
following is the full and impressively long list of initiatives presented to 
voters on the Fall 1990 ballot: 
State Ballot Propositions, Fall 199037 
124 Local Hospital Districts 
125 Rail Cars and Locomotives 
126 Alcohol Tax 
127 Property Tax Exemption for Earthquake Improvements 
128 Natural Environment, Public Health 
129 Drug Enforcement, Taxation, Bonds 
130 Forest and Wildlife Protection Bond and Initiative 
131 Term Limits, Ethics, Campaign Funding 
132 Marine Resources Initiative 
133 Anti-Drug Programs: Sales Tax and Prison Terms 
134 Alcohol Tax Initiative 
135 Pesticide Regulation 
136 Voting on State and Local Taxes 
137 Initiative and Referendum Process 
138 Forestry Programs and Timber Harvesting Bond and Initiative 
139 Prison Inmate Labor 
140 Terms of Office, Retirement, Operating Costs 
141 Toxic Chemicals 
142 Veterans Bonds 
143 Higher Education Bonds 
144 Prison Bon9s 
145 Housing Bonds 
146 K-12 School Bonds 
147 County Jail Bonds 
148 Water Bonds 
149 Park and Recreation Bonds 
150 County Courthouse Bonds 
151 Child Care Bonds 
36. San Franoisco Chronicle, 23 March 1996. 
37. San Francisco Chronicle, 31 October 1990. 
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The fall 1990 election saw one of the smallest off-year voter turn-
outs in the state's history. Political commentators suggest that nervous-
ness about economic recession and the potential war in the Persian Gulf 
kept voters home, but there may have been additional reasons.38 Out of 
the twenty-seven initiatives, thirteen, or 50%, were bond issues. A small 
voter turnout generally means that older, more conservative voters domi-
nate at the polls, and these voters, when worried about the economy, 
were much less likely to pass bond issues which would increase the 
state's debt load. Even Prop 148, an initiative placed on the ballot by the 
legislature to establish a fund for a water resources program failed with 
a 56% "no" vote, whereas moderate water initiatives were typically 
approved by voters. In 1988, for example, all three clean water proposi-
tions placed on the ballot by the state legislature passed by healthy 
margins of 72%, 62%, and 65% "yes" votes.39 
Out of the twenty-seven 1990 initiatives, only four (138, 135, 130, 
and 138) have been treated in the literature as related to the environ-
ment. We suggest that this definition of what is "environmental" is very 
limited, and extend our analysis to three additional initiatives, Prop 148 
(discussed above), Prop 141, "Toxic Chemical Discharge," and Prop 132, 
"Marine Resources." These initiatives also involve environmental issues 
and their omission from analyses both of direct democracy and 
environmental initiatives is both startling and distorting. 
Prop 141 was presented to voters by the legislature in order to 
extend to public agencies the 1988 Prop 65, which prohibited private busi-
nesses from discharging or releasing toxic chemicals into any of the 
state's water systems. Independent state Senator Quentin Kopp, Assem-
blyman Lloyd Connelly, and taxpayer advocate Richard Gann promoted 
Prop 141 as imposing uniform standards on both private businesses and 
public agencies, thereby plugging a significant loophole left by Prop 65. 
Opposition came not from industry, but from various public water 
agencies and water management systems which resisted forced compli-
ance with Prop 65's safeguards. Prop 141 provides a good example of 
the sort of legislation that might have been passed through negotiations 
in the state capital without going to voters. That it was presented to 
voters attests to the strength of resistance within public agencies. Swept 
along the current of "vote no" and fears of increased costs, Prop 141 
failed, but by only a 52% "no" vote.40 
Prop 132 was the only environmental initiative to pass in 1990, with 
a 56% "yes" vote. The initiative was sponsored by Assemblywoman 
Doris Allen, chairwoman of the Committee to Ban Gill Nets, and 
38. Los Angeles Daily Journal, 7 November 1990. 
39. <http:/ /holmes.uchastings.edu> 
40. Ibid. 
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supported by state Senator Quentin Kopp, the highly respected and 
non-political Marine Mammal Fund, The Dolphin Connection, a univer-
sity professor of environmental biology, and an Earth Island Institute 
research biologist. Opponents included the fishing industry, two 
renown, longtime Bay Area seafood restaurants, and the Fisherman's 
Union of America. Prop 132 extended the legislative ban on the use of gill 
nets and trammel nets in coastal waters of northern California as well as 
in central and southern California waters in order to increase protection 
of marine mammals. It compensated fishers who lost their gill and tram-
mel net permits with revenues gained from increased fees on sports fishing 
activities. Prop 132 was a narrowly defined law to protect marine mam-
mals: costs to the state were minimal, compensation to commercial fishers 
was included, and no powerful corporate interests were involved. Even 
in the "vote no" climate of 1990, voters passed this animal protection 
act. Whereas environmental initiatives that were the product of political 
manipulation or were closely related to corporate interests generated a 
widespread "no" vote, with Prop 132 voters indicated their ability to 
identify and pass a simpler and seemingly fairer measure. 
Not only did California voters often vote discerningly, they consis-
tently indicated support for direct democracy and an understanding of 
its flaws. A 1992 study found that 66% of the public held a favorable 
view of the initiative process, but that 72% found that it had "gotten 
out of control in California elections." Voter complaints included "mis-
leading television advertising, the dominance of moneyed special interests, 
and the excessive complexity of ballot measures." Some wanted more 
disclosure of financial contributors in initiative advertising; others 
suggested contribution limits on donations to campaigns.41 Yet for all 
their criticism of the initiative process, voters understood only too well 
that business interests were well able to spend the large sums of money 
necessary to influence decisions made by California's legislature or to 
contribute to its inaction. As columnist Harold Gilliam points out, "For 
years there have been reports on pesticides, herbicides and other toxic 
wastes that poison workers and water supplies and the people and ani-
mals that drink from them. However, with a few honorable exceptions, 
the Legislature has taken no effective action. Could it be that campaign 
contributions from big polluters have caused lawmakers to be timid on 
this subject?"42 For all its weaknesses and potential for abuse, in a 
political climate corrupted by corporate power, the initiative process 
remained the only method by which citizens had a chance to improve 
the quality of their environment. 
41. California-Commission on Campaign Financing, p. 19. 
42. San Francisco Chronicle, 7 October 1990 . . 
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In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills identified corporations, the U.S. 
President, and the military as a dangerous trilogy of power dominating 
American life in the 1950s. Faced with this power, he argued that "only 
through the initiative, the referendum, and the recall can an awakened 
and intelligent citizenry guaranty American democracy continuing life." 
Writing in 1986, after many states had considerable postwar experience 
with direct democracy, Joseph Zimmerman continues where Mills left 
off, concluding that "the initiative generally has been a salutary adapta-
tion of the legislative process which has educated citizens with respect 
to important public policy decisions... Critics notwithstanding, the 
general electorate has been discriminating in examining the pro and con 
arguments for an initiated proposition prior to deciding upon how to 
vote. Experience with the initiative and the referendum supports the 
Aristotelian concept of the "collective wisdom of the voters" and mixed 
election results show that voters are not "enthralled with the rhetoric of 
ideologues," but pass a balance of liberal and conservative initiatives.43 
This does not mean that the initiative system is not in need of 
reform. After two years of study, in 1992 the California Commission on 
Campaign Financing published its findings. Its recommendations 
included: 
- a 5,000 word limit on initiatives, which would necessarily narrow 
their focus; 
- a series of public hearings to allow proponents to amend initia-
tives before a final vote, with a requirement for negotiation between 
proponents and the legislature in order to refine wording unchangeable 
once passed by voters; 
- a mandatory floor vote in the legislature for measures qualified 
for ballot to guide voters and clarify political positions; 
- amendments to initiatives by the legislature if a super-majority 
vote of 60% was attained; a longer time to gather signatures in order to 
reduce the financial significance of initially placing an initiative on the 
ballot; 
- disclosure and limitation of campaign contributors; 
- a FCC "fairness doctrine" in publicity for ballot measures; 
- revisions to voter pamphlets to increase readability; 
- and finally, a return to system struck down by . California's 
Supreme Court allowing only conflicting provisions of competing initia-
tives receiving fewer votes at the same election to fail, not entire 
competing initiatives receiving fewer votes. 
43. C. Wright Mills quoted in Laura Tallian, Direct Democracy: An Historical Analysis 
of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Process (Los Angeles: The People's Lobby, Inc., 
1977), p. 77; Zimmerman, p. 96. 
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This latter recommendation was made in order to reflect the will of 
voters to pass as many reforms as possible, and to avoid the use of 
more "counter initiatives prepared and promoted for the sole purpose 
of invalidating an entire initiative" and "more ballot confusion and work 
for the courts." The Commission concluded that a modernized and 
reformed initiative process was a necessary "check on the potential 
abuses of governmental power while the need for that safeguard 
remains."44 Given the record of legislative and gubernatorial foot-
dragging and tremendous corporate pressures, this is certainly true in . 
the case of environmental legislation. Hardly dazzlingly white, but by no 
means absolutely black, the history of direct democracy in California, as 
measured by the election results of environmental propositions in the 
late twentieth century, does indeed reveal a case for cautious optimism. 
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